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DISTRIBUTIVE PROVISIONS
NORMAN A. WIGGINS*

Before proceeding to discuss the distributive provisions of the new
law, it is well to remind ourselves that the new act' is applicable to the
estates of decedents dying intestate, or partially intestate, 2 after July 1,
1960. The distribution of estates of decedents dying intestate prior to
July 1, 1960 shall continue to be governed by the former North Carolina
intestacy law.3 For the next few years it is going to be extremely important that the exact date of the intestate's death be determined before

entering upon the administration, settlement, and distribution of the
estate.
STATUTE OF DISTRIBUTION AND CANONS OF

DESCENT

REPEALED

It is common knowledge within the legal profession that the former
North Carolina intestacy law4 was, for the most part, inherited from
England as a part of the common law of that country. At common
law the intestate's realty descended directly to his "heirs" who were
determined -by the Canons of Descent. 6 Personal property passed to
the' intestate's "next of kin" who were determined by the Statute of
7
Distribution.
Under the new Intestate Succession Act both the Canons of Descent
and the Statute of Distribution are repealed. These statutes are replaced by one uniform rule which appears as Chapter 29 of the General
Statutes and this chapter governs the distribution of both real and personal property.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY ABOLISHED

In determining persons who shall inherit property when one dies
intestate there is no longer any distinction between real and personal
* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest College.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 29 (Supp. 1959).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-8 (Supp. 1959).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1, 28-149 (Supp. 1959).
'Ibid.
By 1711 the assembly of the colony of Carolina, in order to clarify where the
common law stopped and the colonial law began, declared that the common law
and all English statutes were binding in the colony, especially those statutes "confirming the inheritance and titles of land are and shall be in force here, although
this province or the plantations in general are not mentioned." 1 THE COLONIAL
RECORDs OF NORTH CAROLMA (1662-1712)

790 (Saunders ed. 1886).

See also

Bassett, The Constitutional Beginnings of North Carolina, 12 Joixs HOPKINS
UNIvERSITy STuriEs 46 (1663-1729) (1894).
'2 BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARIES 208-34 (1771); HALE, THE COMMON LAW
OF ENGLAND 250-74 (1713).

"1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c.10.
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property. The new act S eliminates the difference between the descent
of land and the distribution of personal property. Henceforth, in the
-distribution of property the right of inheritance will depend upon the
-degree of relationship of the beneficiary or heir to the intestate and not
-upon whether the property is real or personal. This is made clear by
the use of the term "share." The share of intestate property which any
person is entitled to receive "includes both the fractional share of the
personal property and the undivided fractional interest in the real
property .... With the abolishment of the distinction between real and personal
-property and with the establishment of a single class of heirs for the
purpose of distributing intestate estates, there was no longer any need
for the separate terms "heirs," or "heirs at law," and "next of dn."
The new law recognizes this fact and replaces these terms with the
single term "heir." An "heir" is defined to be "any person entitled to
take real or personal property upon intestacy under the provisions of
this chapter."' 1
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANCESTRAL AND NON-ANCESTRAL

PROPERTY ABOLISHED
The doctrine of ancestral property was founded upon the fifth common law canon of descent." The doctrine provided that on a failure
of lineal descendants of the person last seized of land the inheritance
should pass to the collateral relations who were of the blood of the first
purchaser (i.e., the person who first brought the land into the family).
North Carolina has long retained the ancestral property doctrine as a
12
part of its intestacy law.
Under the former law two exceptions were recognized. The first
exception provided that where ancestral property was transmitted and
the blood of the ancestor was extinct, the collateral kin of the intestate
inherited notwithstanding the ancestral property doctrine.' 3 The second
exception allowed a surviving parent to inherit ancestral property from
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-3(1) (Supp. 1959).
'N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 29-2(6) (Supp. 1959).
0
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-2(4) (Supp. 1959).
112

BLACKSTONE,

COmmENTARmS 221

(1771); 6 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY
BLACKSTONE, op. Cit. .. pra

1 1001 (1958); Note, 42 YALE L.J. 101, 103 (1932).

at 221, stated that the origin of the ancestral property rule was feudal in nature.
Other writers explain the ancestral property rule in the fact that its principal
effect was that of keeping a woman's land in her own family and returning property to the side of the family from whence it came. 2 PoL~ocK & MArILAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 298-99 (1895).
"2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1(4) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739]; Elledge v.
Welch, 238 N.C. 61, 67, 76 S.E.2d 340 (1953); Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N.C.
650,1875 S.E. 930 (1912).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1(5) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739].
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the intestate when he died without leaving issue, or brothers or sisters
14
or issue of deceased brothers or sisters.
The new act' 5 abolished the distinction between ancestral and nonancestral property. Henceforth, it will no longer be necessary in the
distribution of intestacy property to determine the source from whence
the decedent acquired the property.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN RELATIONS OF THE WHOLE AND

HALF-BLOOD ABOLISHED
Under the sixth common law canon of descent it was provided that
collateral kindred of the half blood could not inherit the intestate's land.'0
The rule for distributing personal property was the opposite, namely,
that relatives of the whole blood and half-blood would share equally the
intestate's personalty.
As early as 1784 North Carolina recognized the gross injustice of
the exclusion of the half-blood from the inheritance of land and provided
that the lands of the intestate would be inherited equally by relations of
both the whole and half-blood. 1 However, the cases construing the law
constantly held that rules six' s and four' 9 of the former statute of descent
had to be harmonized and construed together.20 Thus, the intestate's
collateral relations of the half-blood, under the provision of rule six,
inherited only where, under the requirements of rule four, they were of
the blood of the purchasing ancestor from whom the estate descended
by gift, devise or settlement. The net effect of the requirement was
that the ancestral property rule was invoked to bar inheritance by the
intestate's collateral relations as the half-blood who were not as the blood
of the first purchaser.2 '
The new act provides 22 that in the distribution of intestate property
there is to be no distinction between relations of the whole and halfblood. An application of the new rule may be illustrated with the following example. F, who owned Blackacre, a North Carolina farm, in
"I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1(6) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739, as amended].
1
rN.C. GEN. STAT. §29-3(2) (Supp. 1959).

1"2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 208-34 (1771); 6 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY

S1000
(1958).
"'N.C.
Laws 1784, ch. 22, as reported in 1 IREDELL, THE PUBLIC Acts OF THE
GEmAL
ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 156 (Martin rev. ed. 1804).
8
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1(6) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739, as amended].
"- Note 11 supra.
" In Paul v. Carter, 153 N.C. 26, 27, 68 S.E. 905 (1910), the court said: "These
two rules [six and four] were adopted at the same time . . . and, as they relate

to the same subject, or are in pari materia, should be construed together, and it was
clearly intended that they should be."
" For cases invoking the ancestral property rule to bar inheritance by the
half-blood under the former law, see Ex parte Barefoot, 201 N.C. 393, 160 S.E. 365
,(1931) ; Noble v. Williams, 167 N.C. 112, 83 S.E. 180 (1914) ; Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N.C. 650, 75 S.E. 930 (1912).
11N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-3(3) (Supp. 1959).
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fee simple, died intestate. S, the only son and heir of F, inherited
Blackacre. Later S married W and by her had three children, A, B,
and C. S died intestate in 1950. Blackacre was inherited by the three
children of S, subject to W's dower. Later W married H and two children, D and E, were born to H and W. W died in 1955.
On the basis of the above stated facts, assume that B died intestate
and unmarried in 1958. B left surviving him his full brothers A and C,
and half brothers, D and E. Under these facts B's half brothers D and
E, children of W's second marriage to H, would inherit no interest in
Blackacre because they were not of the blood of S or F, the purchasing
ancestor who first brought the land into the family. B's entire interest
would pass to his full brothers A and C. This is the effect of construing
together rules six and four of G.S. § 29-1 of the former intestacy law.
If under the same circumstances B had died July 15, 1960, this being
subsequent to the effective date of the act, the whole and the half-blood
brothers of B would have inherited equally B's interest in Blackacre.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION UPON INTESTACY

The new act provides that the estate of a person dying intestate shall
descend and be distributed subject to the payment of costs of administration, claims, and state inheritance taxes. 23 To aid in determining
what is included in the term "estate" it is defined to mean
all the property of a decedent including but not limited to .. .an
estate for the life of another; and... all future interests in property not terminable by the death of the owner thereof, including
all reversions, remainders, executory interests, rights of entry and
all limitations and
possibilities of reverter, subject, however, to 24
conditions imposed upon such future interests.
The definition of "estate" includes property in which the decedent
owns a present inheritable interest, and property in which he owns a
future, nonpossessory interest which is not terminable by his death.
An estate for the life of another was included in the definition in order
to preserve the effect of former G.S. § 29-1 (11). For example, if A
transfers Blackacre to B for the life of C and B dies intestate before C
(who is the measuring life), B's interest in Blackacre will descend as if
it were an inheritable estate to the heirs of B during the remainder of
C's life.
The term "estate" should be distinguished from the term "net estate."
It is a share of the "net estate" which the heir is entitled to inherit. As
defined by the new act the term "net estate" means "the estate of a
"' N.C.
" N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 29-13 (Supp. 1959).
GEi;. STAT. § 29-2(2) (Supp. 1959).
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decedent, exclusive of family allowances, costs of administration, and
'25
all lawful claims against the estate.
It should be pointed out that the new law makes no change in the
long accepted principle that the personal property of the decedent is the
primary fund for the payment of the intestate's debts. 26 Only when there
is an insufficiency of personal property can the administrator resort to
realty for the payment of debts.
SHARES OF PERSONS

WHO

TArE UPON INTESTACY

To facilitate the distribution of intestate property the new act treats
separately the share of the surviving spouse 7 and the shares of persons
other than the surviving spouse.28 For purposes of this discussion we
will give individual treatment to each subject.
Share of Surviving Spouse
Formerly in North Carolina a surviving wife, when the husband died
leaving issue surviving, received a child's share of the personal property 20
and a dower interest in the realty.30 If the husband died leaving no
issue surviving, the wife's share of the personal property was increased.,,
Similarly, a surviving husband, when the wife died leaving issue surviving, received a child's share of personalty3 " and a curtesy interest
in the realty.3 3 If the wife died, leaving no issue surviving, the husband
inherited all of his wife's personal property but received no interest in
her real property.3 4 The husband and wife could never inherit real
property directly from each other except in those relatively rare cases
where there were no other heirs to make a claim. 35
"N.C.

GEN. STAT. §29-2(3) (Supp. 1959).
STAT. § 28-81 (Supp. 1959) ; Alexander

N.C. GEN.

80 SME2d 369 (1959).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (Supp. 1959).
" 'N.C. GEN.
N.C. GEN.
8 N.C. GEN.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

v. Galloway, 239 N.C. 554,

§ 29-15 (Supp. 1959).
§ 28-149(2) (1950) [N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 46, § 1].
§ 30-4 to -14 (1950) [304: N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72 ch.

.193, §44; d,-5: N.C. Laws 1827, c. 46, as amended; -6: N.C. Pub. Laws 8me
chi. 93, § 35; -7: N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, chi. 73, § 1 ; -8: N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch.
73, §2; -9: N.C. Pub. Laws 1923, ch. 65; -10: N.C. Pub. Laws 1923, ch. 67, §2;
-11: N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, chi. 93, § 39; -12: N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93,
§§ 40, 41, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1891, ch. 133, as amended, N.C. Sess. Laws

1945, chi. 116; -13: N.C. Pub Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, § 42, as amended, N.C. Pub.
Laws 1893, chi. 314, as amended, N.C. Pub. Lawvs 1931, chi. -393, as amended, N.C.
Pub. Laws 1939, ch. 339; -14: N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, § 43].
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-149(3) (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 113, § 53,
as amended].
"N.C. GiEx. STAT. § 28-149 (8) (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, chi. 166, § 1,

as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1921, chi. 54].
"8N.C GEN. STAT. § 52-16 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 193, § 30].
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-149(9), 52-16 (1950)
[N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch.
113, as amended; N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, cli. 193, § 30] ; Blankenship v. Blankenship, 234 N.C 162, 66 S.E.2d 680 (1951) (the husband was not entitled to curtesy
unless there was issue of the marriage barn alive).
3,N.C GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (8) (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 7].
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The new law provides that the intestate share of the surviving
spouse shall be as follows:
If the wife or husband was survived by,
(1) a spouse and one child or lineal descendant 37 or descendants of
one deceased child, the spouse will take one-half of the net estate; or
(2) a spouse and two or more children or lineal descendants of
deceased children, the spouse will take one-third of the net estate; or
(3) a spouse, no child or lineal descendants of a deceased child, but
one or both parents, the spouse will take a one-half undivided interest
in the real property, the first $10,000 of personal property and one-half
of the remainder of the personal property; or
(4) a spouse but no child, or lineal descendants of a deceased child,
or parent, the spouse will take all of the net estate.
It will be observed that several important changes have been made
by the new act. For the purpose of inheritance of intestate property the
husband and wife are placed on an equal footing. A surviving spouse,
whether widow or widower, is given an outright fractional share in the
assets of the deceased spouse, and such share includes both real and
personal property. The surviving spouse is made a statutory heir38
of the deceased spouse and placed first in the line of inheritance. Notwithstanding the size of the estate or the number of other heirs, the
surviving spouse's share of the deceased spouse's estate will never be
less than one-third of the net estate.89 In the absence' of parents and
descendants 'of the decedent, the surviving spouse is given all of the
decedent spouse's intestate estate. The share given to the surviving
spouse is a protected share which is guaranteed by an amendment to the
dissent statute.40 Under the amendment the surviving spouse, whether
husband or wife, may dissent from the will of the deceased spouse and
take his or her intestate share.
Shares of Other Persons
After the surviving spouse's share has been deducted or if the intestate left no surviving spouse, the rest of the estate shall be distributed
as follows :41
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (Supp. 1959).
3' " 'Lineal descendants' of a person mean all children of such person and successive generations of children of such children." N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-2(5)
(Supp. 1959).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-2(4) (Supp. 1959).
"A second or successive spouse dissenting from the will of a deceased spouse
may under certain conditions take only one-half- of the amount provided by G.S.
§29-14. N.C. GEN. STAT. §30-3(b) (Supp. 1959).
"N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1959).
'1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-15 (Supp. 1959).
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If the intestate was survived by,
(1) one child or the lineal descendants of one deceased child, the
child or descendants will take all of the net estate; or
(2) two or more children or lineal descendants of deceased children, the children and descendants will take all of the net estate; or
(3) no children or descendants of a deceased child but one or both
parents, the net estate will be divided between the parents or all will
go to the surviving parent; or
(4) no child, lineal descendants of a deceased child, or parent but
brothers and sisters or lineal descendants of deceased brothers or sisters,
the brothers and sisters and lienal descendants of deceased brothers and
sisters will take all of the net estate; or
(5) no child, lineal descendants of a deceased child, parent, brother
or sister, or lineal descendant of a deceased brother or sister but one or
more grandparents, one-half of the net estate will go to the paternal
grandparents or surviving grandparent or their lineal descendants and
the other half to the maternal grandparents or surviving grandparent
or their lineal descendants; or
(6) no grandparent or uncle or aunt or lineal descendants of a
deceased uncle or aunt on the paternal side, the one-half share of the
net estate which would have passed to the intestate's paternal kindred
will go to the intestate's maternal kindred; or
(7) no grandparent or uncle or aunt or lineal descendants of a deceased uncle or aunt on the maternal side, the one-half share of the net
estate which would have passed to the intestate's maternal kindred will
go to the intestate's paternal kindred.
The new act makes a significant change in the former intestacy law.
Under the former law real property could not ascend, and the intestate's
brothers and sisters or their descendants were favored over parents in
the inheritance of real property. 42 On the other hand, the intestate's
parents were prior to the brothers and sisters of the intestate in the
inheritance of personalty. 43 The new act abolishes the limitation on
the inheritance by parents 44 and provides that in the absence of children
and lineal descendants of deceased children the parents are next in the
"2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1(6) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739, as amended];
Weeks v. Quinn, 135 N.C. 425, 47 S.E. 596 (1904).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §28-149(6) (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1915, ch. 37, § 1, as
amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1927, ch. 231, § 1]; Parsons v. Swift & Co., 234 N.C.
580, 587, 68 S.E2d 296, 300 (1951) ; In re Estate of Pruden, 199 N.C. 256, 258,
154 S.E. 7, 8 (1930).
"' There should be no quarrel with the abolishment of this limitation. It is
common knowledge that the former limitation on the inheritance of realty by the

parents was a carry over from the English common law under which property
could not ascend. The exclusion of the parents was in line with the feudal concept that the inheritance should be kept in the blood per stirpes. 2 POLLOCK &
MAiTLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 292 (1895).
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line of inheritance for both real and personal property. In the absence
of parents, brothers and sisters or descendants of brothers and sisters,
the intestate's property is divided equally between the parental and
maternal grandparents. If either paternal grandparent predeceases the
intestate, the surviving parental grandparent takes the entire one-half
of the net estate. If neither paternal grandparent survives the intestate,
the paternal uncles and aunts and their lineal descendants take the onehalf of the net estate which would have gone to the paternal grandparents. An identical treatment is accorded to the one-half share which
passes to the maternal grandparents. In the absence of any paternal
kindred the one-half share which would have passed to the paternal
kindred passes to the intestate's maternal kindred. A like treatment is
accorded to the share of the maternal kindred in case no maternal kindred survive the intestate.
North Carolina, with slight modification, has adopted the parentelic
system for the distribution of intestate property. On the parentelic
basis the descendants of the parents of the deceased have priority over
other descendants of a more remote ancestor of the deceased. For
example, a grandnephew of the deceased takes ahead of an uncle of the
deceased because the grandnephew is within the parentela of, that is,
is a descendant of, the deceased's parents, while the uncle is within the
parentela of the deceased's grandparents.
ADOPTED CHILDREN

45

The new act consolidates the various references to adoption which
were formerly made in the statutes of descent 46 and distribution. 47
Under the former and present law, for the purpose of intestate succession, the child upon adoption is taken out of the bloodstream of his
natural parents and placed in the bloodstream of his adoptive parents.
The new act qualifies the rule in one respect. If the natural parent has
previously married, is married to, or shall marry the adoptive parent,
the adopted child is considered the child of such natural parent for all
purposes of intestate succession.48 In other words, under the circumstances hereinbefore stated, the adopted child is placed back into the
bloodstream of the natural parent the same as if the act of adoption had
not occurred. With the exception of this qualification, the new act
restates the former excellent law of adoption without change.
" .C. GEN. STAT. § 29-17 (Supp. 1959).
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-1(14), (15) (1950) [N.C. Sess. Laws 1947), ch. 832];
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (Supp. 1959).
'N.C.
GEN. STAT. §28-149(10), (11) (1950) [N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 879,

1I"N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 29-17(e) (Supp. 1959).
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LEGITIMATED CHILDREN

G.S. § 29-18 of the new law provides that when a child born illegitimate has been legitimated in accordance with the applicable North Carolina law or the applicable law of any other jurisdiction, such child and
his heirs are considered legitimate for all purposes of intestate succession. It should be noted that the act establishes for persons legitimated
in jurisdictions other than North Carolina the same rights of intestate
succession as for persons legitimated in North Carolina. The section
eliminates a conflict in wording49 which appeared under the former law
by making it clear that the legitimated child and his heirs inherit both
from and through the parents.
When a child born out of wedlock is subsequently legitimated the
rights of intestate succession by, through, and from such child depend
generally upon a construction of the applicable legitimation statute.
Such statutes, being remedial in purpose and in derogation of the common law, often receive a very narrow construction. 0 It is hoped that
when G.S. § 29-18 comes up for judicial construction it will receive a
broad construction in order to effectuate the purpose of the statute.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

At common law a child born out of wedlock was filius nullius, a
child of no one, and could inherit from no one; and no one, except a
spouse and lineal descendants, could inherit from him. 51 The common
law rules were so stringent that even intermarriage by the parents did
not legitimate the child.
Every American jurisdiction has passed legislation eradicating, in
part, some of the stigma of illegitimacy from the offspring.0 Under the
former North Carolina law 3 an illegitimate child could inherit from his
mother, but not through his mother from her relatives. If the mother
left both legitimate and illegitimate children, the illegitimate could not
inherit property from his mother which came to her from the father of
her legitimate children.5"
Under the new Intestate Succession Act 5 the illegitimate child is
made a member of his mother's family so that upon intestacy he and his
descendants take by, through, and from his mother and his other ma'9 Conpare N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-1(16) (1950) [N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, Ch.
832] ("such child and his issue . . . !') with N.C. Gxx. STAT. §28-149(12)
(1950) [N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 879] ("such child ... ").
" 1. re Estate of Wallace, 197 N.C. 334, 148 S.E. 456 (1929).

16 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY

" Vernier

1003 (1958).

& Churchill, Inheritance by and from Bastards, 20 IowA L. REv. 216

(1935).

"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-152,29-1(9), (10) (1950)
ch. 5113, §§ 57, 58; N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, ch. 71, § 11.
"Ibid.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (Supp. 1959).

[N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-6o
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ternal kindred, lineal and collateral, and they take from him. This plan
of succession is carried out in G.S. §§ 29-216 and -2257 as to intestate
succession from an illegitimate person by making the mother and her
family the illegitimate's successors in the absence of a surviving spouse
and lineal descendants. With this exception'the estate of the illegitimate
who dies intestate descends and is dist,'ibuted in the same manner as if
he were legitimate.
PosTHuMous HEIRS
58

At common law and under the former intestacy law5 9 the right of
the posthumously born child to inherit a full intestate share was recognized. It will be recalled that North Carolina has held6" that the posthumous or unborn child may recover his intestate share of his deceased
father's land from a bona fide purchaser who obtained title through a
judicial partition sale.
In some states the applicable statute limits intestate succession to
posthumous children. 61 Statutes in other states limit intestate succession to lineal descendants. 62 In rewriting the former law, G.S. § 29-9
of the new act makes it clear that "lineal descendants and other relatives
of an intestate born within ten lunar months after the death of the intestate, shall inherit as if.they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had survived him."
INHERITANCE BY ALIENS

At common law the alien was excluded from the inheritance of real
property, and likewise the heirs could not inherit realty from the alien.
Blackstone concluded that the exclusion of the alien was predicated upon
the theory that the alien possessed no inheritable blood 3 Furthermore,
if unlimited inheritance rights were granted, the nation might eventually
be subjected to foreign influence. 64 This alleged lack of'inheritable
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-21 (1) (Supp. 1959) provides, "If the intestate is not
survived by a child, children or any lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, but is survived by his or her mother, a one-half undivided interest in the real

property and the first ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) in value plus one-half of
the remainder of the personal property" is taken by the surviving spouse and the
mother
takes the rest.
57
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-22(3) (Supp. 1959) provides that after the surviving
spouse's share has been deducted, or in the absence of a surviving spouse, "if the
intestate is not survived by a child, children or any lineal descendant of a deceased
child or children, but is survived by his mother, she shall take the entire net estate
or share....
"2 BLACKSTONF, COMMENTARIES 208-34 (1771); 6 PowELL, REAL PROPE Yr

119960 (1958).
" N.C. GEiN.

STAT.

§ 29-1 (7) (Supp. 1959).

'0Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907).
1ATKIwsoN, WiIL~s 75 (1953).
Ibid.
BLAcKSTONE, CommExTAREEs 242 (1771).
" 1 BLACKSTONE; COmmENTARIES 372 (1771).
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-blood on the part of the alien also prevented a citizen from inheriting
from another citizen if he were compelled to trace descent through an
alien. By 1700 England had altered the law to the extent necessary to
permit her natural born subjects to inherit even though the ancestors
through whom they claimed were of alien blood. 5
The alien, at common law, could inherit and transmit inheritance to
personal property. This benefit was limited to alien friends. It was only
by special favor of the king that the alien enemy could inherit and transmit inheritance to personalty. 66
The rules which prohibited the alien from inheriting realty were
adopted by North Carolina as a part of its common law. 67 Apparently,
Parliament realized the incongruity of the application of the alien rule
in the colonies and in 1740 it passed legislation allowing any colonist to
become a British subject after seven years of residence in the colony.68
This provision enabled those who otherwise would have been treated
as immigrant-aliens to become citizens of England. Thus, indirectly the
limitation on the inheritance by aliens and those claiming through them
was eased.
After the revolution North Carolina wasted no time in rejecting the
common law limitation on the inheritance by aliens. By 1776 North
Carolina had a provision in her constitution 9 which enabled every person settling within the state, who took an oath of allegiance to the same,
to acquire, hold, and transfer realty. Prior to the Intestate Succession
Act of 1960, the 1776 provision had found its way into statute, albeit
not in the statutes of descent and distribution. 70 Under the prior law
the alien could inherit and transmit inheritance to personalty. The absence of a provision to the contrary allowed the alien to continue to
possess this common law right to inherit and to transmit inheritance to
personalty even after the passage of the 1776 provision. 71 Under the
new act it is provided that "it shall be no bar to intestate succession by
any person, that he or any person through whom he traces his inherit'7 2
ance, is or has been an alien."
The new law does nothing more than to rewrite and place in its
proper setting that part of G.S. § 64-1 which deals with the rights of
inheritance by aliens. The present law governing the inheritance by
11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 6.
"1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 372 (1771).
" 1 THE COLONIAl REcoRDs OF NORTH CAROLINA (1662-1712) 170 (Saunders
ed. 1886).
- "An act for naturalizing such foreign protestants, and others therein mentioned,
as are settled, or shall settle in any of his Majesty's colonies in America, 1740, 13
Geo.9 2, c. 7.
* N.C. CoNsT. § 40 (1776), published in TAYLOR & YANCEY, NORTH CAROLINA
REVISEu LAWS 51 (1821)..
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-1 (Supp. 1959).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (Supp. 1959).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-11 (Supp. 1959).
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aliens as set forth in G.S. § 64-1 seems sufficient. North Carolina has
never been troubled with any large alien population. Thus, while it
may be reasonable to impose some qualifications upon the alien's right
to inherit in California, so as to protect society against the possible mismanagement of property by a large number of disinterested or absentee
owners, the same considerations have not been and are not now present
73
in North Carolina.
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AMONG CLASSES

One of the most difficult questions which arises in the distribution
of intestate property is that of deciding whether the property should be
distributed per stirpes or per capita. The common law and the civil law
did not agree on the answer. The former adhered to the per stirpes
rule, and thus several sets of nephews and nieces would divide among
themselves the shares of property to which their respective deceased
parents would have been entitled. The civil law followed the common
law where lineal descendants were involved; but when the distribution
was to the collateral line and all persons entitled to take stood in the
same degree, they took per capita.7 4
The former North Carolina law required that in the distribution of
personalty, if all the claimants were of equal degree, the distribution
would be per capita. Per stirpes distribution of personalty was allowed
only where it was necessary to bring the claimants into equality of position as next of kin. 75 Thus, if the intestate's next of kin were all
nephews and nieces, his personalty received a per capita distribution.
However, if a sister of the intestate survived, the nieces and nephews
could only take by representing their deceased parents; hence they inherited per stirpes. 76 On the other hand, the former law7 7 provided for
the devolution of real property to lineal descendants and collateral relations on a per stirpes basis.
Article three of the new act78 provides North Carolina with a method
for the distribution of intestate property which departs from, and is more
"' But cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-3, -5 (Supp. 1959), which were passed in 1959
and which make the rights of the nonresident alien to inherit property depend upon

reciprocity.
71 ATKINSON, Wi.Ls 41-50 (1953) ; Page, Descent Per Stirpes and Per Capita,
1946 Wis. L. Rlv. 1.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-149(4), (5), (6) (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69,

ch. 113, § 53, as amended; N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 113, as amended; N.C.
Pub. Laws 1915, cli. 37, § 1, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1927, ch. 231, § 1];
Wooten v. Outland, 226 N.C. 245, 37 S.E.2d 682 (1946) ; Ellis v. Harrison, 140
N.C. 444, 53 S.E. 299 (1906) ; Skinner v. Wynne, 55 N.C. 41 (1854).
70 it re Estate of Poindexter, 221 N.C. 246, 20 S.E.2d 49 (1942) ; 2 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 517 (1771).
71N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (1), (3), (4) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, chi. 739];
Clement
v. Cauble, 55 N.C. 82 (1854).
7
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-16 (Supp. 1959).
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equitable than, the former law. The new laiv0 provides that property
will be distributed per capita to all persons in equal degree. Under the
new rule surviving persons in the degree nearest the intestate will take
the same shares which they would have taken under the former law.
However, all property which would have gone to the deceased members
in the degree nearest the intestate will go as a unit to all persons surviving them in the next degree and be divided per capita among such
persons.
The operation of the new rule for the distribution of property may
be illustrated by the following examples :80
(1) Assume I (the intestate) dies owning an estate valued at
$90,000. I's spouse predeceased him; I's only survivors are his three
living children A, B, and C. Under G.S. § 29-16(1) I's estate will be
divided equally among A, B, and C, with each child taking $30,000. A,
B, and C take the same shares which they would have taken under the.
former law.
(2) Assume the same facts as in example (1) except that I's survivors are his son A; his grandsons D and E, children of I's deceased
son B; his grandsons F, G, and H, children of I's deceased son C.
Under the former North Carolina law8 l surviving son A would have
received $30,000 as his intestate share. Grandsons D and E would have
represented their father B and received $15,000 each as their intestate
share of I's estate. Grandsons F, G, and H would have represented
their deceased father C and received $10,000 each as their intestate share
of I's estate.
The new act directs just how each share is to be calculated. Applying paragraph (1) of G.S. § 29-16(a) to determine the share of a surviving child we find that there is one surviving member of this class,
son A, and two deceased members, sons B and C. Thus, the estate is
to be divided by three, giving son A a $30,000 share which is precisely
what he would have received under the former law.
There remains $60,000 to be distributed. Applying paragraph (2) of
G.S. § 29-16(b) to determine the share of a surviving grandchild we
find that there are five members of this class and no deceased members.
The remainder of the estate, $60,000, is divided by five, giving grandsons
D; E, F, G, and H $12,000 each as their intestate share. The net result
of the application of the new law is to increase the shares of F, G, and H
from $10,000 to $12,000. The shares of D and E under the former law
" G.S. §29-16 does not use the term "per capita." Instead, the statute sets out
in detail how the intestate share of each heir shall be calculated.

"Examples other than those herein set forth may be found in more detail in the
"Special Report of the General Statutes Commission on an Act to Rewrite the

Intestate Succession Laws of North Carolina."
" Authorities cited notes 75 and 77 supra.
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would have been $15,000. Under the new law the shares of D and E
will be $12,000.
(3) Assume the same facts as in example (2) except that at the
time of I's death grandson H, the child of deceased son C, is dead leaving
lineal descendants, J and K surviving. J and K are the great-grandsons
of the intestate. Under these facts, the shares of grandsons D, E, F, and
G remain the same, $12,000 each. However, there is still $12,000 to be
distributed. Applying paragraph (3) of G.S. § 29-16(a) to determine
the share of a surviving great-grandchild we find that there are two
members of this class and no deceased members. The remainder of the
estate, $12,000, is divided by two, giving the great-grandsons of I $6,000
each as their intestate share.
(4) Assume that I, the intestate, dies owning real estate valued at
$90,000. His spouse predeceased him. I's three children A, B, and C
predeceased him. A left one child D; B left three children, E, F, and
G; and C left two children, J and K.
Under the former North Carolina law8 2 the property would descend
per stirpes. D would represent his deceased father A and inherit a
one-third undivided interest worth $30,000. E, F, and G would represent their deceased father B and share a one-third undivided interest
worth $30,000, each taking an interest worth $10,000. J and K would
represent their deceased father C and share a one-third undivided interest worth $30,000, each taking an interest worth $15,000.
To eliminate this patent inequity in the descent of I's real property,
§ 29-16(a) (2) of the new law distributes the property equally, per
capita, among the surviving grandchildren with each child taking a onesixth interest worth $15,000.
Since the new law places no limitation on the right of succession by
lineal descendants of an intestate, it is possible that the intestate might
die leaving surviving him lineals more remote than great-great-grandchildren for whom provision is made under G.S. § 29-16(a). To avoid
unnecessary repetition paragraph (5) of G.S. § 2 9-16(a) provides for
the use of the same formula for determining the shares of persons not
expressly provided for in the statute.
G.S. § 29-15(5) provides that in the absence of grandparents, one
half of the property is to be distributed to paternal uncles and aunts and
the other half to the maternal uncles and aunts. G.S. § 29-16(c) (1)
provides that in determining the share of each surviving uncle or aunt,
the property should be divided by the number of surviving uncles and
aunts plus the number of deceased uncles and aunts who have left children or grandchildren surviving the intestate. Suppose the intestate dies
with three paternal uncles and two maternal uncles as his only heirs.

"N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 29-1(3) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808, ch. 739].
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The question has been raised as to whether G.S. § 29-16(c) could be
construed to mean that the entire property is to be divided by five
instead of one-half of the property being divided by two. I do not believe that such a construction is possible. It will be noted that G.S.
§ 2 9-16(c) provides, "If the intestate is survived by uncles and aunts...
their respective shares in the property which they are entitled to take
-under G.S. § 29-15 shall be determined in the following manner ....
(Emphasis added.) G.S. § 29-15 (5) does not allow the paternal kindred
of the intestate to receive more than one-half of the intestate's net estate
when maternal kindred survive.
LINEAL SUCCESSION UNLIMITED

The new act restates the old law8" to the effect that "there shall
be no limitation on the right of succession by lineal descendants of an
intestate." 8 4 All jurisdictions are in agreement that lineal descendants,
no matter how remote, should take the intestate's property prior to his
collateral relatives. Therefore, the question concerning the extent to
which representation is to be permitted is limited to those cases dealing
with inheritance by collaterals.
COLLATERAL SUCCESSION LIMITED

The inheritance by collaterals of intestate-property often involves
the application of the doctrine of representation.8" The English common law applicable to the descent of real property allowed unlimited
representation by collateral kin of the intestate.8 6 Under the English
Statute of Distribution s all representatives among collaterals more remote than the children of deceased brothers and sisters were excluded.
Formerly, North Carolina, s8 following the old common law rule
applicable to the descent of real property, permitted unlimited representation by collateral kin of the intestate. As originally drafted by the
committee and submitted by the General Statutes Commission to the
legislature, the new act cut off the right of succession by collateral kin
"8N.C. GEN. STAT. §§29-1(3), 28-149(1), (3), (5) (1950) [N.C. Laws 1808,
ch. 739; N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 46, § 1; N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 113, § 53,
as amended].
8, N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 29-6 (Supp. 1959).

85 Representation arises when a persons stands in the place of another as heir and

becomes entitled to inherit what the deceased person would have inherited had he

lived.

:82 BLAcESTONxE, COmmENTARiES 208-34 (1771).

7 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10; see Reppy, The Ordinance of William the Conqueror-Its Implications in the Modern Law of Succession, 42 Ky. L.J. 524, 551-

52 8(1954).
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (Supp. 1959) ; Moore v. Rankin, 172 N.C. 599, 601,
90 S.E. 759 (1916). Only North Carolina and sixteen other states permit unlimited
representation by collateral kin of the intestate. In the majority of the states
representation cannot go further than those claiming to stand in the place of deceased brothers and sisters. See 6 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY 999 (1958).
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who were more than five degrees of kinship removed from the intestate.
It was provided that if there were no persons within five degrees of
kinship to the intestate his property would escheat. This was a reasonable provision since property of the intestate is seldom distributed to a
person more remote than the fifth degree of kinship.8 9
The legislature did not agree with the Commission and the committee and amended G.S. § 29-7 to provide that the intestate's property will
never escheat when he leaves a blood relative capable of inheriting, notwithstanding the remoteness of the degree of kinship of such relative.
The result of the amendment would seem to be that the principle of the
fifth degree limitation on collateral succession is removed only in order
to prevent escheat. Thus, in the distribution of intestate property where
the possibility of escheat is not present, the fifth degree limitation on collateral succession is still applicable.
Under this section the terminal point for collateral kin of the intestate
who are in the same parentela with the intestate's parents and who
inherit through the intestate's brothers and sisters is the intestate's greatgrandnieces and great-grandnephews. The cut-off point for collateral
kin of the intestate who are in the same parentela with the intestate's
grandparents and who inherit through the intestate's uncles and aunts
is the decedent's first cousins once-removed or, as they are sometimes
called, the intestate's second cousins. If there is no collateral relative
within five degrees of kinship at the death of the intestate but there are
other collateral kin who survive, these collateral kin would inherit the
intestate's property in order to prevent escheat.
ADVANCEMENTS

The doctrine of advancements evolved from a rather ancient origin,
having prevailed, at least by custom, as a part of the doctrine of "bairns'
part" in England during the thirteenth century.90 The English statute
"' One noted authority in commenting on the rule which allows unlimited representation in a minority of jurisdictions said, "Even as collateral inheritance itself
serves only to benefit laughing heirs when permitted for distant relatives, so also
excessive use of the representative device in connection with remote collaterals
exaggerates this unfortunate characteristic. All states would be befter serving
current needs by restricting representation to descendants of brothers and sisters
of a decedent." 6 POwELL, REAL PROPERTY J999, at 643 (1958).
002 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, TEE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 348 (4th ed. 1952)
states, "If a testator leaves neither wife nor child he can give away the whole of
his movable goods. If he leaves wife but no child, or child but no wife, his goods
must, after his debts have been paid, be divided into two halves; one of these can
be disposed of by his will, it is 'the dead's part,' the other belongs to the widow, or
(as the case may be) to the child or children. If he leaves both wife and child,
then the division is tripartite; the wife takes a share, the child or children a share,
while the remaining third is governed by the will; we have 'wife's part,' 'bairns'
part,' and 'dead's part.' Among themselves children take equal shares; the son is
not preferred to the daughter; but the heir gets no share unless he will collate the
inheritance that has descended to him, and every child who has been 'advanced' by
the testator must bring back the advancement into hotchpot before claiming a
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of
incorporated into its provisions the advancement doctrine.- Likewise, the principle was included in the statute of distribution
which was codified in North Carolina in 1715.92 By 1784 the advancement principle was made applicable to real property in North Carolina. 3
Since its adoption much of the law of advancements has been developed in the decisions of the court. While the new Intestate Succession Act makes some changes in the substantive law of advancements,
its principal contribution is the codification of much of the present case
law.

The underlying principle of the doctrine is to bring about an equality
of division of the intestate's estate between the heirs, it being the presumption that in the absence of a will the decedent would have so
intended. Thus, North Carolina under the former law94 and under the
new act 95 holds that only entire or total intestacy will bring the advancement doctrine into play.
An advancement is defined under G.S. § 29-2(1) as follows:
"Advancement" means an irrevocable inter vivos gift of property,
made by an intestate donor to any person who would be his heir
or one of his heirs upon his death, and intended by the intestate
donor to enable the donee to anticipate his inheritance to the extent of the gift; except that no gift to a spouse shall be considered
an advancement unless designated in writing as -an advancement.
Under the former law98 the doctrine of advancements was restricted
to gifts from a parent to a child. The new rule extends the doctrine
of advancements "to any person who would be his heir or one of his
heirs." It is recognized that most advancements will pass from the
intestate donor to his child or possibly a grandchild. However, if more
remote kindred receive an advancement, there seems to be no good
reason why they should not account.
An exception is made for the surviving spouse. The new law declares that "no gift to a spouse shall be considered an advancement
unless designated in writing as an advancement." As a general rule
gifts between the spouses are intended as gifts and not as advancements.
However, if the spouse making the gift desires that it be treated as an
advancement he has only to desighate it as such in writing.
bairns' right." 2

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 516 (1771) ; 6 POWELL, REAL PROP'ERTY f 1009 (1958) ; Ebert, Advancements, 51 MICH. L. REV. 665 (1953).
912 PoLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 346-353 (1895).
2

' N.C. Laws of 1715, ch. 48, § 6, as set forth in SWANN, A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE PUBLIC AcTs Or ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NORTH CAROLINA: Now IN
FORCE AND UsE 28 (1751).
"' Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50 S.E2d 901 (1948).
9"Jerkins v. Mitchell, 57 N.C. 207 (1858).
"N.C. GEN. STA.T. § 29-23 (Supp. 1959).
"'Thompson v. Smith, 160 N.C. 256, 75 S.E. 1010 (1912) ; but see Wolfe v.
Galloway, 211 N.C. 361, 190 S.E. 213 (1937), where a gift to a grandchild was

construed to be an advancement.
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The new act codifies the former case law to the effect that whether
the gift is an advancement or not depends upon whether it was "intended
by the intestate donor to enable the donee to anticipate his inheritance
to the extent of the gift." This rule is going to continue to present a
difficult problem of evidence. Who can say just what the intestate donor
did intend? Did the donor intend to take advantage of his exemption
or exclusion under the Internal Revenue Code or did he intend to enable
the donee to anticipate his inheritance or did he intend to accomplish
both objectives with this one gift? To avoid these problems the attorney
should make an effort to ascertain, if possible, his client's intention
concerning any conveyance which later could be considered an advancement.
Under the former law9" it was presumed that gifts of property and
money from the parent to the child were advancements. The burden of
proof was upon the advancee to show that an advancement was not
intended. Under G.S. § 29-24 the old law is changed. The new law9"
provides: "A gratuitous inter vivos transfer is presumed to be an absolute gift and not an advancement unless shown to be an advancement."
Henceforth, the burden of proof is upon the person asserting that the
gift was an advancement. The presumption is prima facie and should
continue to be rebuttable by parol evidence. 100
G.S. § 29-25 restates the old law to the effect that if the amount of
the advancement equals or exceeds the advancee's share of the donor's
estate, he is barred from receiving any other portion of the estate but no
refund can be obtained. If the amount of the advancement is less than
the advancee's share, he is entitled to receive such additional portion as
will give him his full share of the donor's estate.
Under the old law' 1' the amount charged as an advancement was the
value of the property at the time it was made. G.S. § 29-26 of the new
act provides that the value of the advancement is to be determined as
of the time when the advancee came into possession or enjoyment or at
the time of the death of the intestate, whichever first occurs. However,
if the value of the property advanced is fixed by the intestate donor in
a signed writing which designates the gift as an advancement, such value
is deemed the value of the advancement regardless of the time when the
donee came into possession or enjoyment of the property.
G.S. § 29-27 of the new act extends the rule governing the accounting
for advancements when the advancee predeceases the intestate donor. It
" Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50 S.E2d 901 (1948).
"Nobles

v. Davenport, 183 N.C. 207, 111 S.E. 180 (1922); Kiger v. Terry,

119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896) ; Hollister v. Attmore, 58 N.C. 373 (1860).
STAT. § 29-24 (Supp. 1959).
1"N.C.
*0 KigerGEN.
v. Terry,
119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896).
101

Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50 S.E.2d 901 (1948) ; Note, 31 N.C.L.

REv.207 (1953).
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provides that where an advancement has been made and the advancee
dies before the intestate donor, leaving an heir who takes by intestate
succession from the intestate donor, the advancement is to be taken into
10 2
account in the same manner as if it had been made directly to the heir.
03
The new law' provides that a donee has to account for an advancement when ordered to do so by the clerk of superior court of the county
in which the administrator or collector has qualified. This accounting
(or "inventory" as the statute calls it) must be given under oath. If
the donee fails to render the required inventory he is presumed to have
received his full share of the intestate donor's estate.
G.S. § 29-29 provides the procedure whereby the advancee may
acknowledge by a signed writing that he has been advanced his full share
of the donor's estate. The signed acknowledgment bars both the advancee and those claiming through him from further participation in
the donor's estate. There should be no objection to the acceptance of
04
this principle. It is in effect a codification of the present case law.
102 Under the former law the doctrine of advancements was limited for the most
part to gifts from parents to children. Under the former law real property always
descended per stirpes, and grandchildren always had to account for prior advancements to their parents. In cases of advancements of personalty, if the intestate
was survived by children, grandchildren representing deceased parents took per
stirpes and had to account for prior advancements to their ancestor. If the intestate was not survived by children, the grandchildren took per capita and did not
have to account for prior advancements to their parents.
108N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-28 (Supp. 1959); for requirements under the former
law, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-151 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 113, §§ 55,
56];°" In Cannon v. Nowell, 51 N.C. 436 (1869), plaintiff, son of the intestate,

accepted land from his father under an agreement that he was not to receive any
more land from his father. The court held: "heirs take by positive law when the
ancestor dies intestate, and the course of descents cannot be altered by words
excluding particular heirs, or by any agreement of parties." Annot., 28 A.L.R. 427,
434 (1924). In McDonald v. McDonald, 58 N.C. 211, 214 (1859), the plaintiff
executed a written assignment of his expectancy in the estate of his ancestor. The
court held that the plaintiff "did not have anything which he could assign or transfer to another either at law or in equity. But he had a right to make a contract
to convey whatever interest he might in the future have in his cousin's property,
and such a contract, when fairly made upon a valuable consideration, the court of
chancery will enforce whenever the property shall come into his possession." In
Price v. Davis, 244 N.C. 229, 93 S.E.2d 93 (1956), four daughters for a specified
consideration paid them by their father, executed a release of any right to share
in their father's estate. The court held that if the release of expectancy is based
upon reasonable consideration it will be upheld. In handing down its decision the
court noted that Cannon v. Nowell, supra, had never been followed by the North
Carolina court. For a good treatment of the subject, see ATKiNSON, WILLs 725
(1953).

